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DENIED IN FULL

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1. FOLLOWING THE UNCOORDINATED AND ABORTIVE UPRISING BY THE ARMY'S SECOND ARMORED BATTALION ON 29 JUNE, THE MAIN ARMED FORCES PLOTTING GROUP, HEADED BY ARMY AND AIR FORCE GENERALS AND NAVY ADMIRALS, SET 7 JULY 1973 AS THE TARGET DATE FOR A COUP D'ETAT. HOWEVER, THE COUP WILL NOT TAKE PLACE ON THIS DATE, SINCE THE ARMY PLOTTERS CANNOT ASSURE THE OTHER SERVICES THAT IT CAN FULFILL ITS ROLE OF TAKING OVER THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.

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2. THERE IS NO FIXED DATE FOR THE NEXT COUP D'ETAT ATTEMPT, BUT THE PLOTTING OFFICERS ARE TRYING TO MAKE THE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS FOR A MOVE WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. FLAG RANK OFFICERS OF ALL THREE SERVICES ARE MEETING REGULARLY FOR THIS PURPOSE. ADMIRAL ISMAEL H U E P T A, DIRECTOR OF NAVY INSTRUCTION, HAS, AS A RESULT OF THE ABORTIVE UPRISING ON 29 JUNE, NOW BECOME AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE MAIN PLOTTING GROUP. PRIOR TO 29 JUNE, HE WAS AWARE OF THE PLOTTING AND APPROVED OF IT, BUT HE WAS BASICALLY ON THE SIDELINES IN TERMS OF PLANNING.

~~COMMENT: HUERTA IS HIGHLY RESPECTED WITHIN THE NAVAL INSTITUTION. HE IS REGARDED AS AN INTELLIGENT AND EXTREMELY CAPABLE OFFICER.)~~

3. EXCEPT FOR THE DECISION BY HUERTA TO BECOME ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE PLOTTING ACTIVITIES, THE OTHER POSITIVE ASPECT OF THE 29 JUNE AFFAIR WAS THAT THE CARABINEROS (NATIONAL UNIFORMED POLICE) DID NOT MOVE AGAINST THE ARMORED BATTALION. WHILE THE GUARD AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE DID NOT SURRENDER AS WAS REQUESTED BY LT. COLONEL ROBERTO S O U P E R, COMMANDER OF THE ARMORED BATTALION, THE PLOTTING OFFICERS FEEL THIS WAS DUE TO A TACTICAL ERROR ON SOUPER'S PART; I.E., HE SHOULD HAVE ASKED THE

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GUARD FOR THEIR SUPPORT RATHER THAN THEIR SURRENDER.

4. INsofar AS THE MILITARY CONSPIRATORS ARE CONCERNED, THE ABORTIVE UPRISING ON 29 JUNE HAD THE FOLLOWING NEGATIVE EFFECTS:

A. IT HAS DEPRIVED THEM OF THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST PARTIES ARE ALERT AND ARE ACTIVELY PREPARING FOR SIMILAR ACTIONS OF THIS NATURE IN THE FUTURE.

B. IT HAS STRENGTHENED GENERAL CARLOS PRATS, ARMY COMMANDER IN CHIEF.

C. IT HAS CAUSED DISILLUSIONMENT WITHIN THE RANKS OF THE ARMED FORCES BECAUSE MILITARY LEADERS DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPORT THE SECOND ARMORED BATTALION. ~~REDACTED~~ COMMENT: THIS HAS HAD THE SAME EFFECT ON THE OPPOSITION AS A WHOLE.)

D. IT HAS MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT THAN EVER TO LINE UP THE KEY ARMY REGIMENTS IN THE SANTIAGO AREA FIRMLY BEHIND THE COUP ~~REDACTED~~ D'ETAT PLOTTERS.

5. PRIOR TO THE 29 JUNE UPRISING, THE MILITARY PLOTTERS BELIEVED THEY COULD COUNT ON THE SUPPORT OF THE "BUIN" INFANTRY REGIMENT, THE "TACNA" ARTILLERY REGIMENT, AND THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS SCHOOL, IN ADDITION OF COURSE TO THE ARMORED BATTALION.

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THEY WERE AWARE THAT THEY COULD NOT COUNT ON THE INFANTRY SCHOOL. THE EVENTS OF 29 JUNE, HOWEVER, DEMONSTRATED HOW DIFFICULT IT IS FOR A REGIMENTAL COMMANDER TO DISREGARD MILITARY DISCIPLINE AND THE ARMY CHAIN OF COMMAND. GENERAL PRATS, GENERAL MARIO SEPULVEDA, AND GENERAL CARLOS PICKERING, ALL OF WHOM ARE PRO-GOVERNMENT, DIRECTLY ASSUMED COMMAND OF THE UNITS IN ORDER TO PUT DOWN THE UPRISING. A KEY PROBLEM FOR THE MILITARY PLOTTERS IS NOW HOW TO OVERCOME THIS VERTICAL COMMAND IMPEDIMENT. ONE WAY WOULD BE FOR THE PLOTTING ARMY GENERALS TO MEET WITH GENERAL PRATS, ADVISE HIM HE NO LONGER ENJOYED THE CONFIDENCE OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND, AND THUS REMOVE HIM. THE PLOTTERS CHOICE TO REPLACE PRATS, AT THE TIME A COUP D'ETAT IS TO BE ATTEMPTED, IS GENERAL MANUEL TORRES, COMMANDER OF THE FIFTH ARMY DIVISION AND THE THIRD RANKING ARMY GENERAL. THE PLOTTERS DO NOT REGARD GENERAL AUGUSTO PINOCHET, WHO IS THE SECOND MOST SENIOR OFFICER IN THE ARMY, AS A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR PRATS UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS.

6. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] NO IMMINENT MOVE BY THE

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PLOTTING GROUP IS FORESEEN. NONETHELESS, TENSIONS WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES ARE NOT BELIEVED TO HAVE SUBSIDED SINCE THE EPISODE OF 29 JUNE. THE ARMED FORCES ARE AWARE OF AND ARE CONCERNED BY REPORTS THAT THE POPULAR UNITY (UP) FORCES ARE DISTRIBUTING WEAPONS TO THEIR SUPPORTERS. ALSO, THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION THUS FAR THAT PRESIDENT SALVADOR A L L E N D E INTENDS TO ATTEMPT TO HOLLIFY THE ARMED FORCES BY ADOPTING SOME OF THE MEASURES THEY RECOMMENDED TO HIM DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO THE POSSIBLE ENTRY OF THE MILITARY TO THE CABINET.

THE CHILEAN^{1.5 (c)} ARMY FEELS THAT ALLENDE HAS A TACIT COMMITMENT TO COMPLY WITH SOME OF THESE MEASURES. GIVEN THE CURRENT POLITICAL/MILITARY AMBIENCE IN CHILE, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT SOME MILITARY MOVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT COULD DEVELOP IN THE NEAR FUTURE, PROMPTED BY UNFORESEEN EVENTS.)

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